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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the debt maturity structures of Malaysian firms based on the presence of 
family-related directors (FRDs) on boards. The motivation is derived from the board 
composition literature, which highlights reforms taken place over the years in order to ensure 
proper governance mechanisms. Conversantly, debt maturities are also linked to reductions in 
agency costs whereby firms with short-term borrowings will be subject to greater levels of 
monitoring by markets. Furthermore, this reduces information asymmetry. Thus, the paper 
evaluates the effectiveness of FRDs in alleviating the agency problem by studying the trade-
off of such presence on debt maturity structures. The study finds that firms with the presence 
of FRDs tend to opt for longer maturity structures. These points towards a substitution effect 
where firms with FRDs will not rely on short-term borrowing as a mechanism for reducing 
agency problems. The findings of the study are further validated given that the presence of 
FRDs is not motivated by firms matching strategy of assets versus liabilities. However, these 
firms also opt for long-term borrowing in order to mitigate potential liquidity problems. The 
study further documents that these firms face lower bankruptcy costs. Interestingly, the 
authors also document that FRD opt to lengthen maturity structures during periods of 
increase in share prices indicating that control by family members tend to take into 
consideration shareholders’ wealth maximization. The finding is valid given that most firms 
with FRD also tend to have significant ownership by families.  
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